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 1 
Chapter 9 
International Legal Positivism and Legal 
Realism 
D. A. Jeremy Telman 
1. Introduction 
The initial encounter between Legal Realism and Legal Positivism 
in the United States did not go well.
1
 During the first half of the 
twentieth century, Legal Realism came to dominate the legal 
academy in the United States. Although they shared many 
assumptions with Legal Positivism, Legal Realists utterly ignored 
Kelsenian legal positivism, seeing it as a version of the various 
formalisms that Legal Realism had rejected. HLA Hart’s 
positivism was largely quarantined in jurisprudence courses far 
from the core of professional training that is the main mission of 
law schools in the United States. 
But twentieth century Legal Realism has itself come to seem 
rather quaint. Its early practitioners aspired to a social scientific 
approach, but they lacked the requisite empirical and 
methodological tools. In the past decade, a New Legal Realism has 
emerged, and its practitioners are as a group more philosophically 
sophisticated and more familiar with empirical social scientific 
methods than were the original Legal Realists. Perhaps as an 
inevitable by-product of globalisation, some US academics have 
attempted to apply the New Legal Realism to international law, 
and since positivism is a far greater force in the academic 
discourse relating to international law than it is in the domestic 
context, international law becomes the realm in which a dialogue 
between the new Legal Realism and Legal Positivism becomes 
both inevitable and necessary. 
                                                 
1
 Anthony J Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (CUP 1998) 
1–2 (fn.6). 
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This chapter is a contribution to that dialogue. It begins with two 
background sections that describe the initial encounter between 
Legal Realism and Legal Positivism in the US academy and the 
elements of the New Legal Realism, including examples of New 
Legal Realist approaches to international law. In a third section, 
this chapter notes that the New International Legal Positivism 
(NILP) holds out great promise for specifying the nature of 
international legal norms and the potential limitations on the 
efficacy of such norms. With its forthright embrace of the 
inescapability of uncertainty in law, the NILP adopts a sceptical 
position very similar to the Legal Realism. However, the NILP still 
requires a New International Legal Realist supplement in order to 
provide a fuller understanding of the way in which legal norms 
interact with non-legal factors and to help us describe, predict and 
analyse the behaviour of actors in international affairs. At the same 
time, New International Legal Realists can learn from the sceptical 
attitude towards sources of law developed by the New 
International Legal Positivists. The two movements can be 
symbiotic if brought into closer dialogue. Nonetheless, this section 
concludes with a dose of pessimism about the capacity of any of 
the currently available theories of international law to fully 
assimilate the complexities of both postmodern theory and 
postmodern global society into a comprehensive theory of 
international law in the postmodern world. 
2. Legal Realism and Positivism 
In the United States, the home of Legal Realism, the positivist 
tradition is largely represented through the work of HLA Hart and 
various responses thereto.
2
 The vast majority of American 
academics, to say nothing of law students and practicing attorneys, 
are unfamiliar with the work of Hans Kelsen, and most of those 
familiar with it have little good to say about it. This section 
                                                 
2
 Sebok treats the legal process school, especially as represented by Herbert 
Wechsler’s ‘neutral principles’ approach and the originalist movement that 
followed from it, as a variant of legal positivism. Sebok, note 1 at 113–216. 
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proceeds in three parts. After a quick review of the basic themes of 
Legal Realism, the section addresses the reasons why Hans 
Kelsen’s legal theory found no footing on American soil. Finally, 
the section will briefly address the very different reception that 
HLA Hart’s positivist legal theory received in the world of Legal 
Realism. 
2.1 Elements of Legal Realism 
As Brian Leiter has noted, many who write about Legal Realism 
reject the notion that there is any core coherence to the movement.
3
 
The movement, if it can be so called, consisted of a diverse group 
of legal scholars
4
 committed to the view that legal decision-making 
turned on ‘something other than, or at least much more than, 
positive law, legal rules, legal doctrine and legal reasoning as 
traditionally conceived’. However, there was no consensus as to 
what that ‘something’ was.5 
Nevertheless, intrepid scholars, including Leiter, claim to 
identify as the twin hallmarks of Realism two forms of rule-
scepticism: the view that legal rules are a myth because law 
consists only of the decisions of courts, and the view that statutes 
and other legislative creations are too indeterminate to constrain 
judges or govern their decisions.
6
 This may be so because 
individual rules are indeterminate or because multiple rules are 
available and legal decision-makers are unconstrained in choosing 
among them.
7
 Brian Tamanaha has summarised Realist 
perspectives as committed to the views that: 1) the law is filled 
with gaps and contradictions and thus is indeterminate; 2) every 
legal rule or principle has exceptions and thus precedents can 
support different results; and 3) judges decide cases based on their 
personal preferences and then ‘construct the legal analysis to 
                                                 
3
 Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal 
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (OUP 2007) 16. 
4
 Michael Steven Green, ‘Legal Realism as a Theory of Law’ 46 William and 
Mary Law Review (2005) 1915–2000 at 1919. 
5
 Frederick Schauer, ‘Legal Realism Untamed’ 91 Texas Law Review (2013) 
749–780 at 756. 
6
 Green, note 4 at 1917–1918. 
7
 Schauer, note 5 at 750 (fn. 2). 
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justify the desired outcome.’8 Brian Leiter reduces Realism still 
further to a ‘core claim’ about judicial decision-making: ‘judges 
respond primarily to the stimulus of facts.’9 
2.2 Legal Realism and Kelsen’s US Reception 
The US legal academy’s rejection of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law 
was over-determined. Kelsen’s lack of influence in the United 
States is best understood as a product of four phenomena that 
relate only tenuously to the substance of Kelsen’s theories. They 
are: Legal Realism’s hostility to anything smacking of formalism; 
the general view that positivism was too politically anaemic to 
stand up to the challenges to the rule of law in the twentieth 
century; the incompatibility of Kelsenian and common law 
approaches to adjudication; and the nature of US law schools as 
relatively a-theoretical training grounds for professionals rather 
than scholars. 
First, before Realism arrived on the scene, US legal scholarship 
had been dominated by a formalist concept of law, which stressed 
‘the purported autonomy and closure of the legal world and the 
predominance of formal logic within this autonomous universe’.10 
Realism defined itself in opposition to this idea of law,
11
 and 
Kelsen’s approach must have appeared to the Realists to be a 
version of the formalism that they had just energetically rejected 
and were in the process of eliminating from legal pedagogy and 
legal doctrine. 
Second, Kelsen’s theory failed political litmus tests because, 
although Kelsen personally supported parliamentary democracy, 
his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him to avoid 
connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory.
12
 
As early as 1946, Gustav Radbruch declared that positivism had 
                                                 
8
 Brian Tamanaha, Beyond The Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of 
Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2010) 1. 
9
 Leiter, note 3 at 21. 
10
 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ 57 Toronto Law Journal 
(2007) 607–660 at 611. 
11
 Dagan, note 10 at 612. 
12
 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Bonnie L 
Paulson, Stanley L Paulson (trs), Clarendon Press 2002) 3. 
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rendered the German legal profession defenceless against laws 
with arbitrary or even criminal content.
13
 Lon Fuller, one of the 
most influential philosophers of law in the United States during 
Kelsen’s lifetime, concluded that legal positivism had helped pave 
the way for the Nazi seizure of power. In a 1954 essay, Fuller 
wrote that the Nazis ‘would never have achieved their control over 
the German people had there not been waiting to be bent to their 
sinister ends attitudes towards law and government that had been 
centuries in the building’. These attitudes included being 
‘notoriously deferential to authority’ and having ‘faith in certain 
fundamental processes of government’.14 In a 1958 exchange with 
HLA Hart, Fuller declared positivistic philosophy incompatible 
with the ideal of fidelity to law.
15
 At a time when fascism and 
totalitarianism posed genuine threats to the ascendancy of 
democracy as the global model for governance, Kelsen’s theory 
did not seem to US academics to provide a sufficiently robust 
defence of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against abuses of 
the law by fascist or totalitarian governments. 
Kelsen faced and continues to face two additional problems in 
the United States legal academy relating to issues of pedagogy and 
the nature of legal education. The first problem is that legal 
education in the United States is a form of professional training. 
Students did not – and still often do not – come to law school in 
search of enlightenment. They come in order to get the skills, the 
professional credentials and the contacts that will enable them to 
succeed in their chosen profession. Theorising about the nature of 
the law occurs at the margins of the law school experience, with 
most students taking only one or two classes during the course of 
their legal educations that focus on jurisprudence. In addition, 
common law legal education is a very practical affair, in which the 
students engage intensively with the case law. Kelsen’s highly 
abstract and theoretical approach to the law could not have been 
                                                 
13
 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ 1 
Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung (1946) 105–108 at 107. 
14
 Lon L Fuller, ‘American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century’ 6 Journal of 
Legal Education (1954) 457–485 at 466–485. 
15
 Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’ 
71 Harvard Law Review (1958) 630–672 at 646. 
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more alien to the way in which US students are inculcated into 
legal doctrine. Untethered as the Pure Theory of Law is to any 
concrete examples drawn from familiar cases or even statutes, it 
had almost no chance of appealing to students in US law schools. 
Given the development of legal education in the United States as 
a form of professional training, with jurisprudence sequestered in a 
tiny corner of the curriculum, Kelsen’s approach was unlikely to 
have much appeal for US lawyers-in-training. Although the recent 
Carnegie report on legal education faults law schools for focusing 
on teaching doctrine at the expense of ethical formation,
16
 students 
actively resist the latter and crave the former. Even if students were 
inclined towards theory, most do not arrive at law school with the 
sort of analytical skills that would enable them to understand, 
much less appreciate, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. 
2.3 Legal Realism and Hartian Legal Positivism 
Until relatively recently, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism were 
routinely viewed in the American academy as incompatible.
17
 
Brian Leiter has argued otherwise.
18
 It may be that the two 
jurisprudential approaches, while perhaps not incompatible, are 
concerned at their core with different questions. Legal Positivism 
attempts to explain what law is, and Legal Realism attempts to 
understand how judges decide cases – in particular how they 
decide the relatively rare ‘hard case’.19 If that is so, then Legal 
Realism exists as a supplement to Legal Positivism, illustrating 
how law works at the margins (or penumbra) of clear legal rules 
whose ‘core’ meaning is routinely enforced and adhered to.20 
However, some defenders of Legal Realism argue that the effect of 
its insights into the nature of law and legal processes cannot be so 
                                                 
16
 William M Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the 
Profession of Law (Jossey–Bass 2007) at 144. 
17
 Leiter, note 3 at 59. 
18
 Leiter, note 3 at 80. 
19
 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 136–147; Karl Llewellyn, 
‘Some Realism about Realism’ 44 Harvard Law Review (1931) 1222–1264 at 
1239. 
20
 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ 71 Harvard 
Law Review (1958) 593–629 at 607–608. 
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constrained. As Frederick Schauer has recently observed, 
‘[d]etermining whether and when [Legal Realism’s] genuinely 
non-traditional and destabilizing version of law’s operation is true 
is an empirical question, the pursuit of which is an important part 
of future research in the Realist spirit’.21 
3. Elements of the New Legal Realism 
In an American legal academy in which it has long been a cliché to 
observe that ‘we are all Realists now’,22 one might wonder why 
there would be a need for a revival of Legal Realism. In fact, the 
label New Legal Realism (NLR) seems to refer to two distinct 
movements, one of which might be a subset of the other. One 
branch of NLR takes up the Legal Realist project, narrowly 
defined, as one concerned with what judges do, but the new Legal 
Realists are far more proficient in empirical research methods and 
thus can far better assess the interplay of law, politics and judicial 
personality. More broadly understood, NLR is the methodological 
successor to Legal Realism: it applies social scientific and 
empirical methods to all of the subject matters with which legal 
academics concern themselves and offers solutions with an eye to 
promoting progressive social change. 
3.1  Inheritance from (Old) Legal Realism 
Both variants of NLR see themselves as building on original Legal 
Realism by using social science to advance legal knowledge. 
Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein describe NLR as ‘an effort to 
understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable 
hypotheses and large data sets’. They view this project as a 
realisation of Karl Llewellyn’s goals for Legal Realism.23 In 
particular, Miles and Sunstein discuss a body of work that 
                                                 
21
 Schauer, note 5 at 780. 
22
 Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 (University of North 
Carolina Press 1986) 229; Green, note 4 at 1917. 
23
 Thomas Miles, Cass Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ 75 University of 
Chicago Law Review (2008) 831–854 at 831. 
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attempts, through empirical, quantitative investigation, to specify 
the effect of judicial ‘personality’ on legal outcomes, as well as the 
institutional contexts that encourage or constrain the effects of 
judicial temperament of legal outcomes.
24
 While the research is not 
yet advanced enough to establish robust conclusions, this 
scholarship indicates that, for the most part, judicial ‘personality’ 
comes into play only in the ‘hard cases,’ either because judges are 
constrained by law in most cases to rule in certain ways regardless 
of their political or ideological orientations, or because the 
members of the judiciary are so similar to one another in outlook, 
training and core values that they tend to all exercise their 
discretion in the same way, while a body more representative of 
the general population might produce a greater variety in 
outcomes.
25
 The former explanation tames Realism; the latter 
leaves it untamed.
26
 
More broadly understood, NLR employs both legal theory and 
empirical approaches in order to both explain doctrine and promote 
legal solutions to public policy dilemmas.
27
 Thus, in a volume of 
essays on behavioural law and economics, which Daniel Farber 
termed a new form of Legal Realism,
28
 Cass Sunstein collects 
some essays on the effects of heuristics and biases in legal decision 
making,
29
 but most of the contributions take on legal problems 
beyond judicial decision-making, such as contract formation, stock 
market analysis, vaccination decisions, jury awards, redistributive 
effects of legal rights, nuisance law, risk regulation, legal 
                                                 
24
 Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 834. 
25
 Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 845. 
26
 ‘Tamed’ and ‘untamed’ are Frederick Schauer’s terms for a Realism that 
only affects outlier (hard) cases and a Realism that goes to the core of all legal 
decision-making processes. Frederick Schauer, note 5 at 749. 
27
 Howard Erlanger et al., ‘Foreword: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?’ 
2005 Wisconsin Law Review (2005) 335–363 at 337. 
28
 Daniel Farber, ‘Toward a New Legal Realism’ 68 University of Chicago 
Law Review (2001) 279–303. 
29
 Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, Amos Tversky, ‘Context-Dependence 
in Legal Decision Making’; Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘A Positive Psychological 
Theory of Judging in Hindsight’ in Cass Sunstein (ed.), Behavioral Law and 
Economics (CUP 2000) 61–95, 96–116. 
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bargaining dynamics, and tax.
30
 As Farber notes, like the Legal 
Realists, the behavioural law and economics approach seeks ‘to 
use the social sciences to understand the behaviour of legal 
decision-makers and the effects of legal rules’.31 
While Brian Leiter has called into question claims that Legal 
Realism actually engaged in empirical research drawing on the 
social sciences,
32
 NLR insists on doing legal scholarship from the 
bottom up and from the top down simultaneously by making use of 
empirical research as well as qualitative methods and theoretical 
insights developed in the social sciences.
33
 If nothing else, it seems 
that NLR is grappling with the challenges of introducing 
specialised knowledge and methodology into legal discourse in a 
more systematic way than did old Legal Realism.
34
 
NLR also associates itself with a progressive politics, based on 
the naive hypothesis that social scientific inquiry into the efficacy 
of political structures would yield a progressive critique of those 
structures.
35
 With its combination of empiricism, a call for the 
incorporation of social scientific methods into legal scholarship, 
and its progressive politics, NLR seems at times like a rebranding 
of the Law and Society movement, as both NLR and Law and 
Society have been associated with the University of Wisconsin,
36 
and NLR invokes both pragmatism and the Law in Action 
approach, which is also related to Law and Society.
37
 
3.2  The New International Legal Realism 
                                                 
30
 See range of essays in Sunstein, note 29 at 116–186 and 211–421. 
31
 Farber, note 28 at 303. 
32
 Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Realisms Old and New’ available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079810 (accessed XXX) 8. 
33
 Erlanger, note 27 at 339–340. 
34
 Erlanger, note 27 at 341–342; Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 831. 
35
 Erlanger, note 23 at 344. 
36
 Four of the six co-authors and co-organisers of the Wisconsin Law Review’s 
special issue on NLR were professors of the University of Wisconsin at the time. 
37
 Erlanger, note 23 at 356–357. Two of the three editors of a large anthology 
of Law in Action articles, Stewart Macauley and Elizabeth Mertz are also 
University of Wisconsin law professors and key players in NLR. Stewart 
Macauley et al., Law in Action: A Socio-Legal Reader (Foundation Press 2007). 
10  [JULY 2013] 
Just as NLR can be divided into a narrow and a broad version, the 
New International Legal Realism (NILR) comes in two very 
different strains. The first is Rationalism, which ranges from a law 
and economics to a behavioural economics of international law. 
But various normative theories associated with international 
relations – Liberalism38 and Constructivism39 –as well as 
international legal theories ranging from Harold Koh’s 
Transnational Legal Process
40
 to Paul Schiff Berman’s Global 
Legal Pluralism,
41
 could also be viewed as qualifying as variants of 
Legal Realism in international legal theory.
42
 
3.2.1 Rationalist International Legal Theory 
While NLR draws broadly on social scientific methodologies 
derived from fields like history, anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology, Rationalist international legal theory, developed by 
scholars like Eric Posner, Jack Goldsmith, Oona Hathaway and 
Andrew Guzman, supplements Chicago-school law and economics 
with behavioural law and economics while retaining assumptions 
associated with traditional International Relations realism.
43
 While 
Rationalism has its roots in NLR, there are subtle differences in the 
                                                 
38
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 
2004); Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics’ 51 International Organization (1997) 513–553. 
39
 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism 
in Social Theory and International Relations (Routledge 2013); Alexander 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999); Friedrich V 
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (CUP 1989). 
40
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process After September 11’ 22 
Berkeley Journal of International Law (2004) 337–354; Harold Hongju Koh, 
‘Transnational Legal Process’ 75 Nebraska Law Review (1996) 181–207. 
41
 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law 
Beyond Borders (CUP 2012). 
42
 Terminological confusion seems unavoidable. The international law and 
international relations theories that I am discussing here as a variant of Legal 
Realism are all clearly distinguishable from and in many cases a reaction against 
the International Relations realism that has dominated the field in the United 
States since the middle of the twentieth century. 
43
 Andrew T Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory (OUP 2008); Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (OUP 2005). 
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methodological recipe that lead the NILR to have dramatically 
different political valences than NLR. 
While NLR is clearly a progressive movement, NILR is 
politically diverse, and given the left-wing tilt of the legal academy 
generally and of international legal scholarship in particular, this 
diversity puts NILR on the conservative end of the scholarly 
spectrum. For example, Eric Posner and Miguel FP de Figueiredo 
used classic NLR methods to demonstrate that justices of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) exhibit bias towards their own 
countries, their countries’ allies and to countries that are, in some 
respect, similar to their own countries.
44
 Posner then follows up 
with an argument that, as a result of this exhibited bias, the ICJ has 
experienced a decline in its institutional legitimacy, resulting in a 
smaller docket consisting of less momentous cases.
45
 Posner 
applies classic Legal Realist methods in service of a revisionist 
scholarship at odds with the progressive agenda of both classic 
Legal Realism and NLR.
46
 
Rationalist international legal theory focuses on states as the 
relevant actors
47
 assumes that states are unitary actors
48
 and that 
states for the most part pursue their self-interest in the conduct of 
their international relations.
49
 This new Rationalism benefits from 
                                                 
44
 Eric A Posner, Miguel de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Justice 
Biased?’ 34 Journal of Legal Studies (2005) 599–630. 
45
 Eric A Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press 
2009) 144–145. 
46
 Oona Hathaway, Ariel Lavinbuk, ‘Book Review: Rationalism and 
Revisionism in International Law – Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, The Limits 
of International Law’ 119 Harvard Law Review (2006) 1404–1443 at 1406–
1407. 
47
 Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 3; Guzman, note 43 at 17. 
48
 Guzman, note 43 at 19; Hathaway, Lavinbuk, note 46 at 1432. 
49
 Guzman, note 43 at 17; Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 13. 
12  [JULY 2013] 
the long-delayed
50
 dialogue between international legal theorists 
and international relations theorists within the US academy.
51
 
The great advantage of the Rationalist approach to international 
law is its parsimony.
52
 The Rationalist model has very few 
working parts; it takes into account only a few variables and thus 
seeks to transform international legal theory from a descriptive into 
an explanatory and predictive model.
53
 While Rationalists 
acknowledge that non-state actors play a role in international 
affairs, they do not consider the role of non-state actors to be so 
significant that Rationalist theory needs to take non-state actors 
into account in order to explain and predict the course of 
international law.
54
 Rationalist models thus do not account for sub-
state units, multinational corporations and transnational NGOs.
55
 
Rationalists are generally committed to treating states as unitary 
actors.
56
 Rationalist theory associates the preferences of states with 
states’ ‘leadership’,57 which usually means the leaders of the 
states’ executive branch of government, since that branch has the 
dominant role in formulating foreign policy. Rationalist theory 
thus downplays the importance of competing factions within the 
executive branch, nor does it devote much attention to legislative 
input into international law-making or foreign policy decision-
making. Some Rationalists assume that domestic courts can and 
should play no role in shaping international legal rules or 
compliance with such rules.
58
 Finally and not surprisingly, 
                                                 
50
 Oona Hathaway, Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International Law 
and Politics (Foundation Press 2005); Stephen Krasner, ‘International Law and 
International Relations: Together, Apart, Together?’ 1 Chicago Journal of 
International Law (2000) 93–99 at 93. 
51
 Emilie M Hafner–Burton, David G Victor, Yonatan Lupu, ‘Political 
Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field’ 106 AJIL (2012) 
47–97 at 48. 
52
 Guzman, note 43 at 21. 
53
 Hathaway, Lavinbuk, note 46 at 1424. 
54
 Guzman, note 43 at 8–9; Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 4–5. 
55
 Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 5; Guzman, note 43 at 21. 
56
 Guzman, note 43 at 19. 
57
 Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 6; Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, ‘The 
New International Law Scholarship’ 34 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 463–484 at 472. 
58
 Posner, note 45 at 207–225. 
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Rationalism assumes rationality. ‘Rationality’ here means that 
states are guided by their perceived self-interest and not by legal 
norms, which Rationalists treat as a product of state interests.
59
 
Rationalists set out to improve the discipline of international 
legal scholarship by establishing standards of methodological and 
empirical care. Thus like NLR, Rationalism seeks to improve on 
the methodological rigor with which Legal Realism is practiced. 
Rationalism has clear scientific – or at least scientistic – ambitions. 
It aspires to ‘frame claims as testable hypotheses’.60 In order to do 
so, it self-consciously simplifies the world of international 
relations of international law.
61
 It sweeps aside suggestions that 
states might be motivated by considerations other than self-
interest, as well as the perhaps more significant challenges 
associated with the maddeningly complex processes whereby 
states identify and pursue their interests. 
3.2.2 Normative Realist Theory 
In this short chapter, it is impossible to do justice to the wealth of 
fresh theoretical approaches that have recently emerged in 
international legal scholarship. What unites the approaches 
addressed here under the rubric of normative NILR is a two-fold 
rejection of Rationalism. First, normative NILR rejects the 
assumptions that states are unified, rational actors and that one can 
either describe international relations or predict behaviour by 
focusing exclusively on state action. Second, normative NILR 
theorists view legal norms as having an independent valence that 
affects the choices of legal decision-makers. In short, normative 
NILR looks beyond the maximisation of self-interest in order to 
explain how various actors behave on the international stage. As 
we shall see in the discussion below, while NILR is in some ways 
compatible with positivism, most NILR theorists are traditional 
Legal Realists who believe that non-legal factors play a very large 
role in the formation, interpretation and (selective) enforcement of 
                                                 
59
 Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 13. 
60
 Goldsmith, Posner, note 57 at 466. 
61
 Robert Hockett, ‘The Limits of Their World’ 90 Minnesota Law Review 
(2006) 1720–1790 at 1724. 
14  [JULY 2013] 
international legal rules. Normative NILR also provides useful 
insights into the limits of Rationalist NILR. 
As its normative NILR critics note, Rationalists generally 
promote the advantages of their understanding of international law 
vis-à-vis other theoretical models based on their model’s superior 
ability to predict state behaviour with respect to international law.
62
 
In practice, however, Rationalism has not established itself as a 
useful predictive tool, in part because the Rationalist model often 
simply assumes rather than establishes that states are self-
interested, rational actors.
63
 Rationalists renounce all assumptions 
as to the interests that drive state conduct and acknowledge that 
generalisation is hazardous.
64
 Sometimes states are driven by 
pursuit of security; sometimes by pursuit of prosperity. Rationalist 
theory cannot tell us when one interest will prevail over another or 
if we can even know what interest is driving foreign policy.
65
 As a 
result, Rationalists run into difficulties because they are no better 
at identifying states’ interests than are international legal scholars 
who adopt normative theories. Even when Rationalists focus on 
particular case studies, they can offer only ‘reasonable conjectures’ 
about state interests.
66
 
In addition, NILR scholarship rebuts the Rationalist assumption 
that states are the only relevant actors in international affairs by 
detailing the range of international agreements and both 
international and domestic adjudications to which entities other 
than states have been parties,
67
 while also noting that customary 
international law, including customary human rights and 
humanitarian law can bind private actors, such as corporations.
68
 
More generally, much of NILR theory recognises that individuals, 
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acting singly or in association with others, play in the ‘formation, 
reaffirmation, and termination of international law’.69 
In its quest for parsimony, Rationalism can simplify the world of 
international relations and international law beyond recognition.
70
 
Robert Hockett characterises the dangers of Rationalism as leaving 
us with: 
[A] world of fetishized, black-boxy Scrooge-states, incomprehensibly 
seeking in large part to eat one another, calculating and gaming with 
those and with cognate objectives in view, constrained by no more than 
the weapons that others possess all while ‘empt[il]y, happ[il]y’ or 
mendaciously speaking as if the routines and mere memoranda of 
understanding that emerge from this contest were law.
71
 
Rationalists justify their focus on states as the relevant actors in 
international law on the ground that doing so in no way hinders 
them from developing testable theses that can help predict conduct 
in the realm of international affairs. However, Rationalism has yet 
to make any testable predictions, and its critics maintain that it is 
incapable of doing so in its present form.
72
 On the other hand, 
while critics of Rationalism point out the dangers of a predictive 
model that derives from assumptions that may not completely 
reflect the complexities and subtleties of international relations, 
those same critics acknowledge that their own more complex 
models do not so readily generate testable hypotheses and lack 
predictive force.
73
 
As a result, NILR, in its two variants, is an incomplete theory of 
international law. Rationalism purports to create working models 
that can both explain and predict state behaviour, but its models are 
so fundamentally flawed as to be of limited value. Moreover, as 
normative NILR recognises, by focusing exclusively on states, 
Rationalism tells only part of the story of international law’s 
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development and impact. Normative NILR provides a far richer 
descriptive model of the interaction of the various actors relevant 
to an understanding of the workings of international law, but that 
very richness prevents normative NILR theorists from articulating 
a coherent approach. Focused like Rationalists on the extent to 
which international law is an efficacious force in the world, their 
models for identifying the mechanisms through which laws are 
made and distinguished from non-legal rationales for behaviour 
remain underdeveloped. 
4. Overlap and Divergence in International Legal 
Realism and International Legal Positivism 
On the surface, NILR and the NILP seem like irreconcilable 
movements. To the extent that NILP is committed to the Kelsenian 
project of a Pure Theory of Law, its project is unsullied by the 
political, contextual, sociological, psychological, economic, and 
ethical considerations that go the heart of NILR. And yet, there are 
ways to put the two approaches to international law into 
conversation with one another. Just as Legal Realism adopted 
positivist assumptions regarding the nature of law and of legal 
authority, the assumptions informing NILR put it far closer to 
positivism than to natural law theory. Where the two approaches 
diverge, that divergence is best understood as a product of the very 
different questions that they pose. NILP, like classical international 
legal positivism and legal positivism more generally, attempts to 
ascertain what law is and whence legal norms derive their 
authority. NILR, while informed by positivist notions about the 
derivation of legal norms, is far more dedicated to the question of, 
to borrow a title from a leading NILR practitioner, how 
international law works.
74
 
4.1 Elements of the New International Legal Positivism 
                                                 
74
 Guzman, note 43. 
 International Legal Positivism and Legal Realism 17 
One hesitates to even acknowledge NILP’s existence, as it is 
difficult to identify the adherents of the movement. In promoting 
formalism in law-ascertainment, Jean d’Aspremont does not offer 
a defence of legal positivism as a whole. D’Aspremont gives two 
main reasons for resisting the conflation of positivism and 
formalism. First, formalism is but one of many tenets of 
positivism, not all of which he is willing to embrace. More 
importantly, even among themselves, positivists cannot agree on 
how to define and delimit their approach to the law.
75
 For the 
purposes of the discussion to follow, we will treat formalism as to 
law-ascertainment as a component of NILP while acknowledging 
that the approaches are related but distinct. 
NILP differentiates itself from classical international legal 
positivism for two reasons: new theoretical challenges arose, and 
the world changed. Classical international legal positivism 
developed at a time when it did not have to respond to Legal 
Realism or Critical Legal Studies, as these movements focused 
their energies primarily on national legal systems. In the past forty 
years or so, as Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont have 
noted, critical approaches found their way into the literature on the 
nature of international law.
76
 At the same time, international 
relations theory and some international legal theory began to take 
note of the significance of non-state actors in world affairs and 
began to conceptualise international law in ways that did not treat 
states as the sole or even the main relevant actors. These new 
conceptions of international law and international relations began 
to call the assumptions of classical international legal positivism 
into question. 
In articulating the characteristics of NILP, Kammerhofer and 
d’Aspremont accept arguendo a narrative, according to which 
classical international legal positivism was done in by its own 
limitations – its focus on states and on the need for state consent to 
create binding rules of international law.
77
 NILP thus adapts the 
fundamental positivist doctrine – that law is a human creation to be 
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evaluated based on its pedigree rather than in respect to moral or 
ethical values – to a world in which law-creating authorities and 
processes can be diverse, overlapping and contested. This 
complicates the positivist project but also adds to its potential as a 
descriptive and predictive theoretical model. 
NILP is also distinguished from its classical predecessors in its 
forthright acknowledgement that the battle against uncertainty is 
unwinnable, and in so doing, it adopts sceptical attitudes towards 
legal rules that are very similar to those that inform legal realism, 
although NILP focuses on a narrower set of sources of uncertainty 
in law. NILP poses problems for which it can provide no solutions 
in its own terms. NILP elaborates on mechanisms for determining 
what the law is, but determining how legal norms and non-legal 
norms interact to shape the behaviour of actors in international 
affairs is beyond the scope of the NILP project.
78
 For example, 
Jean d’Aspremont acknowledges that his formalist approach to the 
ascertainment of law does not reach issues of interpretation. 
Moreover, even with respect to law-ascertainment, d’Aspremont 
acknowledges that, because of the indeterminacy of language, 
‘formalism inevitably brings about some indeterminacy.’79 Jörg 
Kammerhofer’s approach helps us to understand the various types 
of uncertainty that bedevil our attempts to identify legal norms, but 
even if we try to address such uncertainty through a ‘utopian’ act 
of will and adopt the Kelsenian Grundnorm theory, ontological 
uncertainty will persist.
80
 
As a result of these insights, NILP confronts a familiar, 
postmodern world. It does so with a sophisticated version of 
philosophical scepticism while working within a tradition that is 
for the most part simply modern, as opposed to post-modern. In 
some ways, NILP’s inheritance from classical Legal Positivism 
creates tensions with versions of NILR that have their own 
inheritance of Legal Realism’s hostility to anything that smacks of 
formalism and to any approach to legal theory that attempts to 
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bracket out legal from non-legal reasoning. There is nonetheless a 
great deal of overlap in the worldviews of NILP and NILR writers. 
4.2 Divergence: Rationalism and the Limits of International 
Law 
To the extent that variants of Rationalism deny law any 
independent valence and insist that states comply with 
international law only when doing so accords with the states’ 
perception of their self-interest, NILR and NILP cannot be 
reconciled.
81
 Similarly, to the extent that NILP dismisses 
arguments sounding in pragmatism, political expediency, 
effectiveness or Realpolitik as not legal in nature,
82
 even if NILP 
recognises that non-legal arguments may be relevant to legal 
outcomes, it rules out any possible dialogue between the two 
approaches, unless the parties agree that NILR is a sort of extra-
legal supplement to NILP approaches. 
But NILP also highlights the weakness of Rationalism to the 
extent that Rationalism treats law not only as largely irrelevant but 
also as largely fixed. Jean d’Aspremont correctly notes that 
Rationalism has not had much success in the realm of international 
legal theory, even if it is accorded a more respectful audience in 
international relations theory.
83
 Rationalism asks what motivates 
states to comply or to fail to comply with legal obligations, but it 
rarely takes into consideration the complexities involves in 
determining what those legal obligations are. In some ways, NILP 
takes the lessons of the ‘untamed Realism’ of the Critical Legal 
Studies movement to heart far more than does NILR. NILP more 
thoroughly acknowledges the epistemological and ontological 
uncertainties that confound our attempts to identify legal norms.
84
 
4.3 Overlap: Normative Theory and the Future of 
International Law 
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NILR and NILP may be most united in a question that seemed to 
divide traditional Legal Realism for earlier variants of legal 
positivism. Both are interested in the problem of uncertainty in 
international law. NILR looks beyond the law to economic theory, 
politics, history and culture in order to explain the ways in which 
legal norms arise, develop, and harden into rules or lapse into 
something akin to positive morality. NILP seeks to identify the 
sources of uncertainty and through both theoretical and legal 
mechanisms, reduce uncertainty in the law wherever possible. 
A formalist approach seems to limit the possibility that 
uncertainties might arise by disfavouring certain types of authority 
on which parties might seek to rely in order to create uncertainty 
where formal rules are otherwise clear. However, d’Aspremont 
defines the concept of ‘law applying authorities’ broadly to include 
‘who[]ever, as a matter of social practice, members of the group … 
identify and treat as ‘legal’ officials’.85 While d’Aspremont gives 
priority to written instruments in the ascertainment of legal rules,
86
 
those written instruments must be understood in light of actual 
practice.
87
 But d’Aspremont seeks to bring the potential cacophony 
to order with the aid of his version of Hart’s ‘social thesis,’ which 
is informed by the philosophy of language.
88
 Ultimately, criteria of 
law ascertainment are to be looked for in the ‘the converging 
practice of law-applying authorities’.89 In short, the existence of 
legal rules requires both formal (preferably written) evidence and 
some regularity of observation. D’Aspremont avoids specifying the 
required degree of regularity, beyond the statement that a feeling 
among law-applying authorities that they are applying the same 
criteria is required.
90
 Here, the distance between NILP and NILR 
seems to be little more than a matter of where one places the 
emphasis in the interplay between words and deeds in the creation 
of legally binding obligations. 
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Timothy Meyer provides a sort of soft Rationalist NILR 
perspective (he calls his approach ‘institutionalist’) on 
d’Aspremont’s work.91 Much of Meyer’s review is appreciative of 
d’Aspremont’s contributions to our understanding of law 
ascertainment, but Meyer rejects d’Aspremont’s distinction 
between law and non-law based on formal indicators and argues 
that informal signalling mechanisms grant states flexibility and 
enhance opportunities for international cooperation.
92
 Where NILP 
attempts to identify and categorise ambiguity in legal rules, 
Meyer’s NILR recognises that ambiguity has its uses. Relying on 
behavioural studies, Meyer contends that parties inclined to be 
law-abiding and risk averse are more likely to comply with fuzzy 
rules than with strict ones, as they go out of their way to avoid 
even the appearance of non-compliance.
93
 In addition, Meyer 
expresses concern that legal formalism can inhibit dynamism in 
international law, and without such dynamism, international law 
would remain powerless over non-state actors and over realms of 
law (such as international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law) where law’s efficacy is greatly reduced if it 
cannot regulate the conduct of non-state actors.
94
 But here too, the 
difference might just amount to a matter of emphasis. As Meyer 
acknowledges,
95
 d’Aspremont’s social thesis incorporates the sort 
of dynamism that his formalism seemingly undercuts. 
Indeed, Meyer brings NILP and institutionalism together 
through the shift from traditional legal positivism’s focus on the 
intent on the states that were bound by international law to a focus 
on the expectations of what d’Aspremont calls law-applying 
authorities.
96
 Meyer restates d’Aspremont’s thesis in 
institutionalist terms: 
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[I]nternational law is most likely to be effective in generating behavioral 
change, not when states act out of a sense of legal obligation, but rather 
when there are shared expectations about the kinds of obligations created 
by an instrument and what the instrument requires of states.
97
 
NILP may distinguish itself from classical international legal 
positivism by the extent to which it acknowledges the limitations 
of what can be accomplished through an analysis of law as such. 
NILP practitioners are constantly reminding their audience that 
their subject matter is law and legal analysis alone. Kammerhofer 
repeatedly advises against methodological syncretism in legal 
analysis, which he believes would hinder scholarly cognition.
98
 
This is not to discount the importance of other factors that might 
affect the behaviour of legal decision-makers, but NILP insists on 
drawing clear lines between legal and non-legal analysis. 
In fact, NILP requires assistance from non-legal analysis 
because it concludes that legal analysis alone cannot resolve legal 
issues. For example, Jörg Kammerhofer concedes at the conclusion 
of his monograph on Uncertainty in International Law that there is 
no possible way of remedying uncertainty through the mechanisms 
of legal positivism.
99
 If the goal is to create a world in which the 
application and enforcement of legal norms is stable and 
predictable, NILP requires a supplement, but that supplement is 
not legal analysis. NILR can provide the necessary supplement, but 
in order to do so, it needs to develop a more robust appreciation for 
the uncertainty in legal norms that NILP identifies, rather than 
treating legal norms as established facts from which international 
legal actors depart because they value non-legal considerations 
over adherence to legal norms. Just as NILP is in need of a Realist 
supplement, NILR needs NILP, as Jean d’Aspremont puts it, ‘for 
the sake of the ascertainment of international legal rules and the 
necessity to draw a line between law and non-law’.100 
Still, one might wonder, if NILP cannot provide any sort of legal 
certainty with respect to the specification of legal rules, how its 
project could be of use. NILP has the great advantage of bringing 
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seriousness and rigour to the analysis of how we ascertain legal 
rules and identify legal norms. But a rigorous inquiry into these 
questions yields only uncertainty, meaning that ultimately the 
question of how norms are to be interpreted, what norms are 
applicable to a specific legal question, or how to adjudicate 
differences in cases of overlapping and seemingly contradictory 
norms cannot be answered exclusively with the tools for legal 
analysis that NILP provides. Nevertheless, legal questions are 
decided, and Legal Realism suggests that such decisions have more 
to do with extra-legal factors than with legal positivism’s 
ultimately futile attempts to reconstruct legal norms through 
recourse to legal analysis alone. 
The answer might depend on the pervasiveness of legal 
uncertainty. There may be no ultimate answer to the question of 
how legal norms are to be recognised, interpreted or reconciled, 
but there may be an answer for us. That is, given an actual dispute 
and a set of possible outcomes, we may be able to reach a 
consensus in many cases, purely on the basis of proper legal 
analysis, as to the proper outcome. NILP is extremely useful in 
these cases, and then the challenge is to specify the extent of the 
world of easy cases. Jean d’Aspremont defends the usefulness of 
establishing ‘elementary indicators as to what is law and what is 
non-law’. He also notes that indeterminacy is reined in through the 
social practice of law-applying authorities.
101
 Nonetheless, for 
‘untamed’ versions of NILR, which would treat all controversies as 
‘hard cases’, whether or not legal analysis leads to clarity or 
ambiguity is irrelevant, as cases are ultimately decided on non-
legal grounds. 
4.4 International Law and the Challenge of Postmodernism  
While both NILR and NILP pride themselves on their cognisance 
of certain developments in postmodern theory, it is not clear that 
international law as a field has really come to terms with the 
challenges of the postmodern world. It may well be that the 
consequences of postmodernism are simply too destabilising to 
incorporate into an approach to law. There is nothing new under 
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the sun. Postmodern insights were anticipated in earlier thinkers, 
going back at least to Heraclitus. If postmodernism is reduced to a 
radical form of scepticism, one can accept the claim that Hans 
Kelsen’s positivist theory is the epitome of postmodernism.102 But 
there are aspects of postmodernism that are far more threatening to 
the NILP (and NILR) project. 
To the extent that one can generalise about ‘postmodern theory,’ 
it is safe say that postmodernism is a response to both the 
intellectual tradition of structuralism and to the influence of 
technology on historical consciousness and self-
conceptualisation.
103
 Postmodernism is generally suspicious of 
master historical narratives and grand theories of the human 
sciences. This skepticism is an abreaction against the teleology and 
optimism that came to be associated with Enlightenment 
rationality, especially as forms of rationality also became 
associated with twentieth century crimes against humanity.
104
 
While structuralism in linguistics and anthropology claimed to 
have uncovered the systems of binary oppositions that underlie all 
manners of communication, deconstruction is a form of ideology-
criticism that focuses both on the distortions created by our mental 
habit of thinking in binaries and on the hierarchical and 
discriminatory nature of binary oppositions. Deconstruction 
challenges legal theory especially forcefully, because binary 
oppositions (legal–illegal, guilty–innocent, binding–non-binding, 
written–oral, timely–late, substantive–procedural) are the very 
stuff of legal systems. Law students are taught to diagram doctrinal 
areas through decision trees, each branch of which is a binary 
opposition. Still, while a systematic deconstruction of international 
law and the international legal system has not been attempted, 
critical approaches to international law do incorporate the 
scepticism attendant to deconstruction to challenge both binary 
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oppositions and the hierarchies that are dependent on the binary 
oppositions on which the international legal order rests. To the 
extent that NILP insists on the usefulness of strict oppositions 
between the legal and the non-legal, between writings and conduct, 
and between formal and informal processes, it swims against a 
postmodern tide. What does international legal positivism look like 
in a world where il n’y a pas de hors-texte?105 
Post-structuralism also challenges the opposition of structure 
and agency. Poststructuralist New Historicists, for example, speak 
not of relationships of power and domination but of ‘the circulation 
of social energy’.106 This postmodern perspective is a product of 
our awareness that we, as human actors, are buffeted by natural 
forces that we do not completely understand and cannot control 
and by technological forces that we have created and yet also 
cannot control. Technological forces are products of human 
agency, yet they can become far more powerful than any 
individual will. Certain institutionalist forms of NILR have come 
to recognise that institutions develop a dynamic of their own, 
becoming what Pierre Bourdieu called both ‘structured structures’ 
and ‘structuring structures’.107 For the most part, however, while 
normative NILR expands the players who may interact in 
international legal processes and develops complicated models for 
their interactions, NILR has not worked out a post-structural theory 
of the dialectic of structure and agency in international affairs. 
NILP, with its focus on generation of norms, often brackets 
questions of structure and agency, as well as the crucial issue of 
power, which is at the centre of Foucaultian post-structuralism. 
It is therefore unclear that either NILP or NILR truly grapple 
with the theoretical and real-world challenges of the post-modern 
world. Postmodernism is not a theoretical construct foisted upon an 
unsuspected world; it responds to real-world stimuli. In the case of 
                                                 
105
 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri Spivak (tr.) Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1976) 158. 
106
 Stephen Greenblatt, ‘The Circulation of Social Energy’ in Stephen 
Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in 
Renaissance England (University of California Press 1988) 1–20 at 6. 
107
 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Richard Nice (tr.) CUP 
1977) 72. 
26  [JULY 2013] 
international law, those stimuli include the proliferation of 
international actors, international law’s pluralist nature, and the 
advent of technologies, ranging from cyber-attacks to bitcoins, that 
blur, or in some instances, erase distinctions between virtual and 
actual phenomena. But postmodernism also challenges us to 
interrogate and ultimately move beyond the binary oppositions that 
are the building blocks of the ways in which we construct our 
understandings of legal systems. It challenges us to think in new 
ways about what we might call the circulation of legal energies 
through overlapping systems and connections and also to think 
about resistances, which may be structural or volitional, to the flow 
of legal energies through the network of connections. 
5. Conclusion 
One can easily imagine a new generation of international legal 
scholarship in which the distinctions between realism and 
positivism become unimportant compared to the enormous overlap 
in perspective among scholars who see themselves as working in 
the two supposedly divergent traditions. Both NILR and NILP 
have abandoned the exclusive, and in some cases even the primary, 
focus on states as the relevant actors in international legal affairs. 
While NILP continues to favour some version of formalism, in 
which the focus of scholarship is on relatively traditional, hard-law 
sources, those sources are understood in a sophisticated manner 
that accounts for law generation processes that encompass the 
entire realm of social interactions that informs norm creation 
domestically and internationally. Most forms of NILR recognise 
the importance of formal legal rules, but NILR approaches can 
help positivists add new nuance to their understanding of the social 
processes underlying the creation of legal norms. While NILR’s 
indebtedness to Legal Realism’s enthusiasm for social scientific 
and empirical approaches can only help it to enrich the 
methodology of international legal scholarship, NILP provides a 
philosophical rigor that will protect the field from a form of 
empirical fetishism. In any case, increased cross-disciplinary 
interaction can only enhance our understanding both of 
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international law and of the role international legal scholarship in 
not only explaining but also in helping to shape international legal 
rules and rule-making processes. 
